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Elusive Justice: The Rohingya Chronic Crisis 
and the Responsibility to Protect 
BY SUMANGALA BHATTACHARYA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The international community is in agreement that the situation of 
the Rohingyas, a Muslim minority residing principally in the Rakhine 
region of Burma/Myanmar’s Arakan state,1 shows ample evidence of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide. In August 2018, the United Nations 
issued a report calling for the prosecution of Burma/Myanmar’s top-
ranking military leaders for genocide and war crimes.2 Since August 
2017, an estimated 650,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh from 
Myanmar.3 Satellite imagery has captured sites of recently charred 
villages.4 Numerous credible reports by human rights groups and 
 
* I wish to extend my thanks to Prof. Marisa Cianciarulo, Doy and Dee Henley Chair in Law, of 
the Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, for her guidance on this project, and to 
this journal’s impressively efficient editorial team. 
 1. The military junta changed the country’s name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, after a 
brutal military campaign that killed thousands in suppressing a pro-democracy movement. The 
United Nations has recognized the name Myanmar, but the two names continue to be used by 
different ethnic groups internally. Some argue Myanmar lacks legitimacy since it was imposed by 
the military government, especially because the country continues its brutal treatment of minority 
populations. I have chosen to use the form Burma/Myanmar throughout this essay to respect both 
the traditional and official versions of the name. See Matt Schiavenza, President Obama Is In 
Burma – Or Is It Myanmar?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2014/11/president-obama-is-in-burma-or-is-it-myanmar/382751/. 
 2. Human Rights Council, Rep. on the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
Myanmar, U.N. Doc A/HRC/39/64 (Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Human Rights Council, U.N. 
Doc A/HRC/39/64]. 
 3. U.N. Office of High Comm’n for Refugees [UNHCR], UNHCR Distributes Aid to 
Rohingya Refugees Ahead of Bangladesh Winter (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
news/briefing/2017/12/5a3399624/unhcr-distributes-aid-rohingya-refugees-ahead-bangladesh-
winter.html [hereinafter UNHCR Distributes Aid to Rohingya]. 
 4. Annie Gowen, “Textbook example of ethnic cleansing”:370,000 Rohingyas flood 
Bangladesh as crisis worsens, WASH. POST (Sep. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing—370000-rohingyas-flood-bangladesh-as-crisis-
worsens/. 
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refugees attest to the widespread arson, rape, torture, and killings of 
Rohingyas by Buddhist vigilantes and the Burmese/Myanmar military.5 
In November 2017, then-U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, stated 
that “it is clear that the situation . . .  constitutes ethnic cleansing” by 
Myanmar’s military forces and vigilantes who have carried out 
“horrendous atrocities.”6 Tillerson’s comments echo the September 
2017 assessment of Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, the United Nations Human 
Rights High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) chief, which 
described the situation as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”7 In 
December 2017, the situation had escalated to the point that an 
estimated 626,000 Rohingyas had fled Myanmar into Bangladesh, with 
the number continuing to grow into 2018.8 In February 2018, Yanghee 
Lee, the United Nations special envoy on human rights in Myanmar, 
declared that the situation bears “the hallmarks of a genocide.”9 
Commenting on reports that what appeared to be mass graves were 
being bulldozed, the UNHCR chief observed that such actions showed 
“a deliberate attempt by authorities to destroy evidence of potential 
international crimes, including possible crimes against humanity.”10 
Violence against the Rohingyas is nothing new. Since the 1970s, 
periodic waves of state and vigilante violence against the community 
have led to large-scale displacements of people.11 The internal 
displacements of Rohingyas and massive refugee exoduses by land and 
sea have become a chronic crisis in the region. Some scholars have 
characterized the Rohingya situation as a “slow burning genocide . . . 
that has taken place over the past thirty-five years.”12 Human rights 
agencies agree. In April 2014, speaking at a conference held in London 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Press Release, Rex W. Tillerson, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Efforts to Address 
Burma’s Rakhine State Crisis (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson
/remarks/2017/11/275848.htm. 
 7. Gowen, supra note 4. 
 8. UNHCR, Human Rights Council Opens Special Session on the Situation of Human 
Rights of the Rohingya and Other Minorities in Rakhine State in Myanmar (Dec. 5, 2017), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22491&LangID=E 
[hereinafter UNHCR, Human Rights Council Opens Special Session]. 
 9. Associated Press, U.N. official says Rohingya Crisis has ‘hallmarks of genocide’, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 1, 2018, 3:02 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/02/01/u-n-
official-rohingya-crisis-has-hallmarks-genocide/1085763001/. 
 10. Stephanie Nebehay & Simon Lewis, ‘Acts of genocide’ suspected against Rohingya in 
Myanmar: U.N., REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2018, 2:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
myanmar-rohingya-rights/acts-of-genocide-suspected-against-rohingya-in-myanmar. 
 11. Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683, 683 (2014). 
 12. Id. 
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entitled, “Decades of State-Sponsored Destruction of Myanmar’s 
Rohingya,” Tomas Ojéa Quintana, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights, stated that the situation of the Rohingyas 
showed “elements of genocide.”13 
By 2014, the crisis had been ongoing for decades. In 1978-79, a 
major military offensive by Burma/Myanmar to curb opposition groups 
in the Arakan state, followed by a campaign of human rights abuses 
targeting the Muslim population, led approximately 200,000 Rohingyas 
to flee across the border to Bangladesh.14 In 1991, the military again 
engaged in a campaign of violence and various human rights abuses in 
the wake of national elections in which the residents of the Arakan state 
(and other parts of the country) overwhelmingly rejected the military-
backed National Unity Party, causing 250,000 Rohingyas to flee into 
Bangladesh.15 In 2012-13, a massive wave of sectarian violence forced 
over 140,000 Rohingyas into squalid camps for internally displaced 
persons and over 80,000 Rohingyas fled to neighboring countries.16 The 
continued plight of the Rohingyas briefly drew international attention 
and outrage in 2015, when news reports emerged that thousands of 
Rohingyas were stranded in international waters in rickety boats, 
without sufficient food or water, as they attempted to flee 
Burma/Myanmar’s apartheid-like conditions.17 The current crisis is 
merely the most recent in a continuum of crises suffered by the 
Rohingya people for decades. 
The current crisis cannot be understood in isolation from its 
historical context. The Rohingya people have been subjected for 
decades to policies of discrimination, socio-economic repression, and 
assaults on cultural identity.18 In 1982, the government of 
Burma/Myanmar passed a law that effectively stripped Rohingyas of 
 
 13. Muang Zarni, Press Release: United Nations expert says there are “elements of 
genocide” against Myanmar’s Rohingya, ROHINGYA BLOGGER (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.
rohingyablogger.com/2014/04/press-release-united-nations-expert.html. 
 14. KAZI FAHMIDA FARZANA, MEMORIES OF BURMESE ROHINGYA REFUGEES: CONTESTED 
IDENTITY AND BELONGING 49–50 (2017). 
 15. Id. at 53. 
 16. Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do is Pray: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic 
Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State 4–6 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.
refworld.org/docid/518230524.html; Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s 
Rohingya Crisis, ATLANTIC, (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/. 
 17. See generally Matt Sciavenza, Asia’s Looming Refugee Disaster, ATLANTIC (May 17, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/asias-looming-refugee-disaster/
393482/. 
 18. Zarni & Cowley, supra note 11, at 685. 
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citizenship.19 Additionally, Rohingyas residing in Burma/Myanmar, 
even those who have lived there for generations, are deemed to be 
illegal aliens.20 Deprived of nationality and even of the legal right to 
reside in their homeland, the Rohingyas have become a stateless people. 
These legislative measures express official governmental sanction 
of the climate of widespread discrimination and hostility against 
Rohingyas promoted by the Buddhist majority culture against the 
Muslim ethnic minority. This discriminatory climate has made the 
Rohingyas susceptible to periodic waves of violence, resulting in 
internal displacement and flight by land and sea to neighboring 
countries.21 Burma/Myanmar’s policies have inevitably created 
conditions of structural violence, which is the systematic deprivation of 
basic necessities that arise from economic, political, social, and cultural 
exclusion.22 The United Nations Secretary General (“UNSG”), António 
Guterres, has observed that any political solution to the crisis must 
address the root causes of “protracted statelessness and its associated 
discrimination.”23 A resolution of the current situation must account for 
the physical violence that has occurred since August 2017 and resolve 
the underlying structural violence that made the atrocities possible. 
Despite the global consensus on the chronic Rohingya crisis, the 
international community has been slow to take actions to protect the 
Rohingyas. Even as the crisis intensified since 2012, the United States 
and other nations have developed an engagement policy for strategic 
and financial ties with Burma/Myanmar.24 Continued engagement with 
Burma/Myanmar by the U.S. and other world powers conveys the 
impression that the international community tacitly accepts the suffering 
of the Rohingyas as an acceptable price for nudging Burma/Myanmar 
further along in the process of democratization and international 
 
 19. Id. at 697. 
 20. Id. at 685. 
 21. Id. at 686. 
 22. Lindsey N. Kingston & Saheli Datta, Strengthening the Norms of Global Responsibility: 
Structural Violence in Relation to Internal Displacement and Statelessness, 4 GLOBAL RESP. TO 
PROTECT 475 (2012). 
 23. Press Release, Security Council, Amid “Humanitarian and Human Rights Nightmare” in 
Myanmar, Secretary-General Urges Full Access for Aid, Safe Return of Displaced Rohingya, End 
to Military Operations, U.N. Press Release SC/13012 (Sept 28, 2017) [hereinafter Press Release, 
Security Council, Amid “Humanitarian and Human Rights Nightmare”], https://www.un.org/
press/en/2017/sc13012.doc.htm. 
 24. Michael Fuchs & Brian Harding, A New Start for the U.S.-Burma Relationship, THE 
HILL (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/274873-a-new-
start-for-the-us-burma-relationship. 
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engagement.25 However, the state’s transition to democracy and global 
openness cannot take priority over establishing durable, rights-
respecting national policies that safeguard all of Burma/Myanmar’s 
people. The international community must not yield to the country’s 
violations of established international human rights norms. 
This paper argues that an invocation of the Responsibility to 
Protect (“RtoP”) doctrine is essential for resolving the chronic Rohingya 
crisis. The RtoP doctrine, which was endorsed at the United Nations 
World Summit in 2005, expresses an international commitment to a 
collective global responsibility to ensure that a state fulfills its 
responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocities.26 RtoP is 
narrowly delineated to cover only four specific crimes: “genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing[,] and crimes against humanity.”27 As a 
framework with shared international expectations of conduct bolstered 
by the prospect of collective state action, the doctrine can create a 
coherent strategy for building lasting solutions to the Rohingya chronic 
crisis, instead of measures that respond to periodic humanitarian crises 
as they occur. 
Although not legally binding, RtoP offers the best chance for 
appropriate and effective solutions in the Rohingya chronic crisis. As I 
discuss below, other international law instruments relating to refugees 
and human rights are inapplicable or inadequate. While the 
implementation of RtoP has been imperfect and inconsistent, the 
doctrine provides a legal framework for putting into practice the 
aspirations of the international community to protect vulnerable people 
from mass-scale atrocities.28 In supporting a “right of humanitarian 
assistance,” the RtoP doctrine balances respect for state sovereignty 
with international norms that regard as unacceptable systematic and 
large-scale violations of human rights.29 When a state is shown to be 
“manifestly failing” to protect its populations from atrocity crimes, 
RtoP pledges the international community to intervene.30 The 
intervention involves a wide range of diplomatic and peaceful options, 
 
 25. Angshuman Chowdhury, What Tillerson’s Myanmar Visit Means, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 
22 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/what-tillersons-myanmar-visit-means/. 
 26. See generally G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 27. Id. at 30. 
 28. Ethical Inquiry: March 2015, BRANDEIS UNIV.: INT’L CTR. FOR ETHICS, JUSTICE & 
PUB. LIFE, https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/ethicalinquiry/2015/March.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019). 
 29. See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, at XI (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20
Report.pdf. 
 30. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26, at 30. 
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with coercive strategies to be used only as a last resort.31 Significantly, 
the RtoP doctrine does not limit coverage only to the citizens of a state 
but to all its “populations,” whether nationals or deemed to be aliens.32 
The RtoP doctrine can be applied to the three main dimensions of 
the Rohingya chronic crisis: the immense humanitarian challenge 
caused by the influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh; the culture 
of discrimination against the Rohingyas in Myanmar/Burma; and the 
long-term constitutional status of the Rohingyas in Myanmar/Burma. 
While the humanitarian refugee crisis is of immediate urgency, the other 
two dimensions speak to the structural violence that undergirds the 
periodic outbreak of atrocities. 
RtoP is necessary to enable Bangladesh to cope with the massive 
refugee influx. The scale of the refugee crisis in Bangladesh requires a 
coordinated international response to build appropriate infrastructure for 
hosting refugees while the terms of return are negotiated with 
Myanmar/Burma. Without the capacity to absorb refugees into the 
country, Bangladesh may feel compelled to negotiate with 
Burma/Myanmar for the return of Rohingyas even in the absence of 
adequate guarantees of their safety. Second, RtoP can generate an 
international mandate for Myanmar/Burma to halt the anti-Rohingya 
violence, and to hold the perpetrators accountable. While a U.N. 
peacekeeping force would ideally oversee the cessation of hostilities, 
diplomatic efforts are even more urgently needed to incentivize the 
government of Myanmar/Burma to act decisively to halt the violence. 
Diplomatic intervention can also assuage Burma/Myanmar’s allegations 
about militant Rohingya separatism by bringing both sides to the table 
to negotiate a lasting solution.33 Third, RtoP can apply preventive 
diplomacy to broker a solution to the question of the Rohingyas’ 
citizenship, which has served as a pretext for the periodic spikes in 
violence. 
The broad coverage of RtoP, which obligates a state to protect all 
people in its territory regardless of nationality or residency status, 
ensures that the issue of the Rohingyas’ contested constitutional status 
within Burma/Myanmar is irrelevant. Any forceful intervention, 
including sanctions or military intervention, will require authorization 
 
 31. Id. at 22; INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 29, at 
IX. 
 32. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26, at 30. 
 33. See Calamur, supra note 16. 
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from the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”).34 However, RtoP 
encourages the deployment of a broad range of peaceful options, such 
as diplomatic, economic, political, and humanitarian measures.35 Talks 
and aid, combined with political pressures related to trade and travel, 
could offer sufficient incentives to Myanmar/Burma to take action. In 
arriving at a lasting solution to the Rohingya crisis, non-forceful 
diplomatic options may be especially productive since the root causes of 
the conflict are ethnic tensions and Burma/Myanmar’s denial of 
citizenship to the Rohingyas.36 The Rohingya chronic crisis requires the 
international community to be actively involved in the process of 
resolution. The peaceful measures drawn from the diplomatic toolkit 
available under RtoP are needed to promote Burma/Myanmar’s move 
towards durable solutions that align with international norms. 
The invocation of an RtoP framework will also have a protective 
function in the future, eliminating the factors that enable the repeated 
cycles of violence and displacement. By showing that the world is 
watching, RtoP can fulfill its aim of prompting the country to take 
appropriate protective measures. Part I of this paper discusses why RtoP 
is preferable for this situation compared to other relevant international 
human rights instruments, even those that are legally binding. Part II 
outlines the development of the RtoP doctrine as an international norm. 
Part III provides a brief background to the evolution of the Rohingya 
crisis. Part IV considers how the RtoP framework can address the 
Rohingya chronic crisis in order to arrive at a lasting peaceful 
resolution. 
I. APPLICABILITY OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS 
Although not legally binding international law, RtoP offers the 
best chance of crafting appropriate and effective solutions for the 
multidimensional complexities of the Rohingya chronic crisis. Unlike 
other international human rights related instruments, RtoP brings to bear 
collective international responsibility in holding states responsible for 
failing to protect all their populations from mass atrocities.37 The 
Rohingya chronic crisis calls for a robust response targeting all aspects 
 
 34. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, at 25, U.N. DOC. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect]. 
 35. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26, at 30. 
 36. See Press Release, Security Council, Amid “Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Nightmare”, supra note 23. 
 37. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26, at 30. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20  7:28 PM 
194 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:2 
of the evolving situation, including the humanitarian emergency and its 
root causes. Legal protections are not enough without real-world 
implementation of such protections. Legal protections alone will not 
benefit the Rohingyas living in internal displacement camps in 
Burma/Myanmar or in prolonged refugee status in Bangladesh. 
Humanitarian assistance alone cannot reach the underlying causes of the 
displacement of civilians or protect civilians directly targeted by 
violence.38 International protection for the vulnerable women, men, and 
children fleeing mass atrocities in Burma/Myanmar must link legal 
obligations to practical mechanisms for delivering assistance. By 
offering a legal framework for collective international action, RtoP can 
bridge the divide between legal and practical protections for Rohingyas 
in circumstances that amount to ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
The international human rights regime, founded on the principles 
of the “inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all 
[persons]” is enshrined in the U.N. Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).39 Formulated as aspirational 
“soft law,” the UDHR is a declaratory document and not legally binding 
on states.40 The provisions of the UDHR have been complemented by 
the subsequent development of a body of legally binding covenants, 
treaties, and customary international law.41 National and regional human 
rights laws have also expanded the normative reach of the UDHR by 
affirming its principles.42 Nevertheless, the international human rights 
regime is limited in its reach because treaties apply only to signatory 
states and typically have weak enforcement mechanisms.43 The U.N. 
Charter adheres to the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs 
of member states, requiring Chapter VII authorization from the UNSC 
for international actions proposed in instances of human rights 
violations.44 Despite the normative influence of the Charter and the 
UDHR, the lack of enforcement power reduces their impact in actual 
crises that involve direct and structural violence against civilians.45 
 
 38. Phil Orchard, The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations 
of Regime-Induced Displacement, 29 REFUGEE STUD. Q. 38, 41 (2010). 
 39. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 1 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 40. GLOB. CITIZENSHIP COMM’N, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY: A LIVING DOCUMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 34 (Gordon Brown ed., 
2016). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Yvonne Dutton, Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties: The Role of 
Enforcement Mechanisms, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2012). 
 44. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7. 
 45. GLOB. CITIZENSHIP COMM’N, supra note 40, at 34. 
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Legally binding international treaties are the cornerstones of the 
international human rights regime.46 The binding nature of these 
instruments and the formalized process for state ratification are believed 
to contribute to their effectiveness in protecting human rights.47 The 
U.N. General Assembly adopts and opens treaties for signatures, and 
treaties come into force after receiving a requisite number of signatures 
and ratifications.48 A formal international ratification indicates a state’s 
commitment to be legally bound by the treaty.49 States become parties to 
a treaty by signing the treaty or acceding to it (the process by which 
states become a party to a treaty they did not originally sign).50 The 
national laws and constitutional provisions of states control whether a 
state may be able to ratify a treaty based on the will of a chief executive 
or if the state needs to seek authorization from legislative bodies.51 
Notwithstanding these formal mechanisms for treaty ratification, 
most international human rights treaties lack strong enforcement 
mechanisms, which reduces their effectiveness in actual crises.52 
Treaties rely on compliance monitoring by human rights bodies and 
voluntary periodic reporting by states that are parties to the treaty.53 
Human rights monitoring bodies rely on the political will of signatory 
states and do not have powers of enforcement, such as sanctions.54 
Signatory states that fail to comply with the terms of a treaty can 
generally escape any punitive actions, and states that have not signed a 
treaty are not bound by its terms.55 The process by which international 
human rights law is enforced has been described as a “transnational 
legal process,” which involves “institutional interaction whereby global 
norms of international human rights law are debated, interpreted, and 
ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems.”56 The long durée of 
such a process makes the legal protections of treaties less relevant to 
crisis situations involving direct violence against civilians and 
 
 46. See generally U.N. OFF. OF LEGAL AFF., TREATY HANDBOOK, at 5–11, U.N. Sales No. 
E.12.V.1 (2012). 
 47. Id. at 9. 
 48. See generally id. 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Harold Honju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 
1397, 1398 (1999). 
 53. UNHCR, Human Rights Bodies, https:www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/pages/humanrights
bodies.aspx (last visited Nov. 18 2018). 
 54. Dinah Shelton, Enforcement and Remedies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 664, 664 (Scott Sheeran & Nigel Radley eds., 2013). 
 55. See generally U.N. OFF. OF LEGAL AFF., supra note 46, at 5–10. 
 56. Koh, supra note 52, at 1399. 
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peripherally relevant in addressing the underlying structural violence in 
such situations.57 
The combination of an ongoing humanitarian emergency with 
long-term structural violence in the Rohingya chronic crisis makes the 
legally binding instruments of international human rights régime less 
effective than RtoP. The most relevant of these instruments is the U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (“Refugee 
Convention”) and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Protocol”).58 The 
Refugee Convention and Protocol define a refugee as “someone who is 
unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion, is outside the country of nationality, and is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country 
. . . .”59 If the Rohingyas can show that they are fleeing persecution 
based on one or more of the five protected grounds, they would qualify 
for refugee status under the Refugee Convention.60 Such recognition 
would confer a range of protections, including the right to freedom of 
movement and the right to work.61 The Rohingyas who are recognized 
as refugees would also have a fundamental human right to seek 
asylum.62 
However, neither Bangladesh nor Burma/Myanmar are signatories 
to the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol.63 While 
Bangladesh has received Rohingyas fleeing from Burma/Myanmar for 
decades, the absence of a national legal framework for refugees has 
resulted in varying standards of treatment.64 During the 1991-92 crisis, 
the Government of Bangladesh granted by executive order prima facie 
 
 57. See generally id. at 1408–16. 
 58. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. 
For the text of the treaties and their status, see U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter V: Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY (last visited Oct. 
14, 2018) [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter V]. 
 59. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee 
Convention]; see also Refugee Protocol, supra note 58, art. 1; U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter V, 
supra note 58. 
 60. Refugee Convention, supra note 59, art. 3. 
 61. Refugee Protocol, supra note 58; Refugee Convention, supra note 59. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.; see generally UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Apr. 2015) (providing data as of April 2015). 
 64. Nour Mohammad, Refugee Protection Under the Constitution of Bangladesh: A Brief 
Overview, 39 REFUGEE WATCH 141, 154 (2012). 
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recognition to Rohingya refugees who entered prior to a cut-off date, 
but many thousands of refugees who missed the cut-off date remained 
in Bangladesh in informal liminal status as illegal immigrants.65 In the 
current 2017-18 crisis, Bangladesh has resisted calls from the UNHCR 
to grant Rohingyas who have fled from Burma/Myanmar refugee status 
because of concerns that such a move will make repatriation efforts 
difficult.66 Additionally, Bangladesh lacks the legal and logistical 
framework to process and adjudicate asylum claims, especially given 
the scale of the crisis. As of January 2018, the Bangladesh government 
has completed biometric registrations of over one million Rohingyas 
who will receive national ID cards.67 
Due to the irregular legal status of the Rohingya refugees, UNHCR 
standards for refugees have been difficult to implement in Bangladesh. 
Most Rohingyas in Bangladesh lack rights, access to humanitarian 
assistance, and pathways to social and economic integration.68 If invited 
by Bangladesh, the UNHCR would be allowed to extend its protections 
to individuals even without a determination of one’s refugee status.69 
Since 1991, Bangladesh has partnered with the UNHCR to provide 
assistance to the Rohingya refugees.70 Although Bangladesh extends 
some constitutional and statutory protections to refugees, it has not 
enacted any national legislation relating to refugees or asylum.71 
Refugees are considered foreigners under the Foreigners Act of 1946 
with residential status granted at the discretion of local district 
administrators.72 Customary international law requires even states that 
have neither signed the Refugee Convention nor the Refugee Protocol, 
 
 65. Samuel Cheung, Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast 
Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 50, 52 (2012). 
 66. Sheikh Shahariar Zaman, Bangladesh Govt Reluctant to Grant Refugee Status to 
Rohingya, DHAKA TR. (Sept. 27, 2017, 11:31 AM), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/
2017/09/26/bangladesh-govt-reluctant-grant-refugee-status-rohingya/. 
 67. Tarek Mahmud, Over one million Rohingyas get biometric registration, DHAKA TR. 
(Jan. 18, 2018, 2:35 AM), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/01/18/one-million-
rohingyas-get-biometric-registration. 
 68. See generally Pia Prytz Phiri, Rohingyas and Refugee Status in Bangladesh, FORCED 
MIGRATION REV., no. 30, Apr. 2008, at 34, https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMR
downloads/en/burma/phiri.pdf (stating that the current situation in Bangladesh is simply 
untenable and refugees still lack freedom of movement, the right to work, and right to education). 
 69. Jeffrey Dillman, International Refugee and Asylum Law, 34 HOW. L.J. 51, 53 (1991). 
 70. Phiri, supra note 68, at 34. 
 71. See generally Mohammad, supra note 64, at 148-50. 
 72. Id. at 153. 
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to obey the principle of non-refoulement.73 This principle gives a person 
classified as a refugee the right not to be returned to a place where his 
life or freedom would be threatened.74 Bangladesh is bound by the 
principle of non-refoulement under customary international law and as a 
signatory to several international human rights treaties that embed the 
principle in their terms.75 However, Rohingyas and humanitarian 
agencies have voiced concerns about expedited negotiations between 
Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar for the repatriation of Rohingyas 
before their safety can be assured and before the root causes of the 
conflict are addressed.76 
Other instruments of international human rights are also not 
effective in the Rohingya chronic crisis. Bangladesh and 
Burma/Myanmar have both signed the United Nations Charter,77 and are 
thus subject to the “soft law” principles of the UDHR. However, the 
Charter has no enforcement mechanisms. Six legally binding core 
treaties structure the international human rights régime complementing 
the UDHR: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), opened in 1966; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), opened in 1966; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(“CERD”), opened in 1966; Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), opened in 1980; 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), opened in 1984; and Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), opened in 1989.78 Bangladesh is a 
 
 73. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulment 
Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 
at 7 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf. 
 74. The principle of non-refoulement, guaranteed by Article 33(1) of the Refugee 
Convention, provides that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion.” Refugee Convention, supra note 59, art. 33(1). 
 75. UNHCR, supra note 73, at 7. 
 76. Human Rights Watch, Burma: Rohingya Return Deal Bad for Refugees (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/11/burma-rohingya-return-deal-bad-refugees. 
 77. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter I: Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018); UNHCR, Status of Ratifications Interactive Dashboard, 
http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (on the left side of the page use the scroll 
bar and select the country profile for “Bangladesh” and “Myanmar” from the menu). 
 78. Core International Human Rights Instruments, UNFPA, https://www.unfpa.org
/resources/core-international-human-rights-instruments (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). 
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signatory to the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC.79 
Myanmar has signed the ICESCR and the CEDAW.80 Although 
conferring legal obligations on signatory states, these treaties rely 
largely on “soft law” enforcement mechanisms of periodic self-
reporting, monitoring by committees of experts, and voluntary 
compliance by states.81  The treaties can promote compliance with 
international human rights norms, but they have no power to ensure that 
states improve their domestic human rights practices.82 While non-
signatories do not need to comply with treaty provisions, the 
enforcement mechanisms, even for signatory states, do not provide 
adequate protections for civilians directly impacted by violence.83 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”), established by the 
Rome Statute in 1998 and entered into force in 2002, does provide a 
robust enforcement mechanism through individual criminal prosecution 
in cases of genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes 
of aggression.84 However, the court’s jurisdiction extends only to 
member states and applies only when certain criteria are satisfied.85 
While Bangladesh has ratified the ICC, Burma/Myanmar is not a 
signatory.86 
Since the statelessness of the Rohingya people is a significant 
contributor to the crisis, two international treaties on statelessness are 
worthy of mention.87 The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, pertaining to the situation of de jure stateless individuals, i.e., 
individuals who are not considered to be nationals under any state law, 
contains provisions for nondiscrimination and a range of rights 
protections.88 The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
requires parties to reduce statelessness through the positive step of 
 
 79. UNHCR, supra note 77 (on the left side of the page use the scroll bar to select the 
country profile for “Bangladesh” from the menu). 
 80. Id. (on the left side of the page use the scroll bar to select the country profile for 
“Myanmar” from the menu). 
 81. See generally Dutton, supra note 43, at 24-25. 
 82. Id. at 28. 
 83. Id. at 1. 
 84. See generally U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII: Penal Matters: Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, https://www.treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018) [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII]. 
 85. Dutton, supra note 43, at 14. 
 86. U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, supra note 63. 
 87. Press Release, Security Council, Amid “Humanitarian and Human Rights Nightmare”, 
supra note 23. 
 88. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1–7, adopted Sept. 28, 1954, 
360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960) [hereinafter Convention on Status of Stateless 
Persons]. 
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granting nationality to individuals born within state boundaries, who 
might otherwise be stateless.89 While both treaties include important 
provisions that would have protected the Rohingyas, Burma/Myanmar 
has not ratified either of them.90 
International human rights laws build acceptance of humanitarian 
norms over time. Although legally binding on states that are signatories, 
the “soft law” enforcement mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of 
these laws in actual crises. Additionally, the treaties are generally only 
applicable to states that have ratified them, except in the rare instances 
in which specific provisions have attained the status of customary 
international law. Unlike these instruments, RtoP imposes a duty on 
states to protect their populations and recognizes a humanitarian 
imperative to intervene through diplomatic efforts, backed up by the 
threat of force when states fail to protect civilians from mass atrocities.91 
Driven by the principle that sovereignty is responsibility, RtoP bypasses 
the need for seeking the consent of the offending state for humanitarian 
assistance.92 This proactive foundation makes the doctrine a powerful 
tool for generating robust solutions in an actual crisis. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RTOP FROM CONCEPT TO EMERGING NORM 
RtoP developed in response to repeated post-Cold War failures of 
individual states to protect vulnerable people from mass-scale 
massacres and atrocities.93 The genocides in Rwanda and Srebenica in 
the 1990s, among other atrocities, prompted expressions of a collective 
abhorrence for the horrors of mass-scale violence.94 In his Millennium 
Report to the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary General Kofi 
Annan introduced the idea that humanitarian intervention was called for 
in response to “gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
 
 89. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1, adopted Aug. 30, 1961, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975) [hereinafter Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness]. 
 90. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter V, supra note 58 (showing that Burma/Myanmar is 
not a “Participant”); Rohingya Crisis: From India to Malaysia, refugees face hardship under 
uncertainty, THE NATIONAL, https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/cohingya-crisis-from-india-
to-malaysia-refugees-face-hardship-and-uncertainty-1.628032 (last updated Sept. 13, 2017). 
 91. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26. 
 92. Rachel Gerber, Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect, STANLEY FOUND. (May 
2012), https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=485. 
 93. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st 
Century, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 2000), http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_
The_Peoples.pdf. 
 94. Id.; see also Roberta Cohen, From Sovereign Responsibility to RtoP, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 54, at 7. 
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offend every precept of our common humanity.”95 The international 
community sought a shared standard that expressed the consensus that 
states that perpetrated atrocities on ordinary persons or allowed non-
state actors to do so could no longer rely on the concept of sovereignty 
to elude the state’s responsibility to protect its people.96 
In response to the call for an articulation of these widespread 
sentiments, the Canadian government established the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”), which 
subsequently published the report entitled Responsibility to Protect in 
2001.97 The ICISS report found that a state bore the primary 
responsibility to protect its people, but when a state is unwilling or 
unable to protect its people from suffering serious harm, the 
responsibility shifted to the international community.98 The report 
observed that changing world conditions, brought about by the end of 
the Cold War and the growing economic interdependence of 
globalization, had laid out the groundwork for multilateral 
cooperation.99 These changing world conditions allow for humanitarian 
military intervention when a state fails in its responsibility of providing 
human security.100 The report identified six criteria that could justify 
military intervention: right authority, just cause, right intention, last 
resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects.101 The concept of 
a collective international responsibility to protect was endorsed in the 
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 
the 21st Century and subsequently in the 2005 report of Secretary 
General Kofi Annan.102 
In 2005, the World Summit nearly unanimously adopted RtoP in a 
narrowed formulation of the ICISS concept. The RtoP doctrine was 
enshrined in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
document.103 Drawing on existing legal responsibilities of states, 
Paragraph 138 identifies the state as bearing the primary responsibility 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 29, at 8. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. at 2, 6. 
 100. Id. at 32. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3 (Mar. 21, 2005); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Forward to Rep. of the Sec’y-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, at vii, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
[hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, Forward]. 
 103. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26, at 30. 
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of protecting its populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing.104 Paragraph 139 offers the central 
innovation of the doctrine in its assertion of a collective responsibility 
of the international community for the protection of vulnerable civilian 
populations. 105 Paragraph 139 states that when a state “manifestly fails” 
in its primary responsibility of protecting its people from extreme 
violence in the four listed crimes, the responsibility shifts to the 
international community to use “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian 
and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of 
the Charter” to undertake “collective action in a timely and decisive 
manner.”106 Shortly after the World Summit Outcome Document was 
published, the UNSC issued a resolution explicitly reaffirming the goals 
of RtoP.107 Paragraph 139 recognizes the centrality of the Security 
Council to RtoP and does not sanction any collective action without 
U.N. authorization. 
As articulated by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in his 
2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the 
implementation of the RtoP doctrine rests on a three-pillar approach: (1) 
the protection responsibilities of the state, (2) international assistance 
and capacity-building, and (3) timely and decisive response.108 The first 
pillar holds that states have a responsibility to protect their own 
populations from the four atrocity crimes specifically enumerated in the 
2005 statement of the RtoP doctrine: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.109 The second pillar holds that 
the international community has a responsibility to assist states in 
fulfilling their obligation to protect their populations.110 The third pillar 
calls for an intervention by the international community once a state has 
manifestly failed to uphold its protection obligations.111 RtoP can 
include the full range of powers, including military action, as sanctioned 
under Chapter VI to Chapter VIII of the UNSC.112 However, RtoP 
encourages the deployment of civilian expertise and resources, with the 
use of force reserved as a measure of last resort.113 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
 108. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34, at 2. 
 109. Id. at 8; see also G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 26, ¶ 138, at 31. 
 110. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34, at 15. 
 111. Id. at 22. 
 112. Id. at 22, 25. 
 113. Id. at 18. 
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Following the U.N. Secretary General’s 2009 report, United 
Nations member states conducted an informal two-day debate in July, 
2009.114 A General Assembly consensus resolution in September 2009 
reaffirmed member states’ commitment to the principles, taking note of 
the Secretary General’s report.115 In subsequent annual reports, the 
UNSG has continued to develop elements of the RtoP framework, 
including the need to develop early warning systems, the role of 
regional and sub-regional organizations, the criteria for timely and 
decisive action, different forms of international assistance, 
implementation strategies, and a commitment to accountability.116 In 
addition to the Secretary General’s annual reports, RtoP has also been 
referenced by the General Assembly in nearly sixty-five resolutions and 
by the Human Rights Council in thirty resolutions.117 Although the 
levels of success vary, the doctrine has been implemented in multiple 
country-specific crises, including crises in Cote D’Ivoire, Mali, Congo, 
Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Libya, among 
others.118 
RtoP has also been contested on various grounds. As a legal 
concept, RtoP has been generally welcomed for a paradigmatic shift of 
the understanding of sovereignty from the rights of territorial integrity 
and non-intervention towards the collective responsibility to protect 
civilians from mass atrocities.119 However, opponents of the doctrine 
point to its potential as a new form of humanitarian interventionism and 
its spotty track record of implementation. For some opponents of the 
doctrine, RtoP is an extension of colonial values into the postcolonial 
world order.120 Critics from the global South accuse RtoP of imposing a 
Westernized ethnocentric notion of “good governance” in ways that 
facilitate neo-imperialist ventures.121 Such critics express apprehensions 
that RtoP could be used as a “Trojan horse” for self-interested 
 
 114. Key Developments on the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations from 2005-
2017, INT’L COALITION FOR RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.
php/about-rtop/the-un-and-rtop (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 115. G.A. Res. 63/308, ¶ 1 (Sept. 14, 2009). 
 116. Key Developments on the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations from 2005-
2017, supra note 114. 
 117. About R2P, GLOBAL CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 118. Jared Genser, The United Nations Security Council’s Implementation of The 
Responsibility to Protect: A Review of Past Interventions and Recommendations for 
Improvement, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 420, 421 (2018). 
 119. See id. at 423. 
 120. Siddharth Mallavarapu, Colonialism and the Responsibility to Protect in THEORISING 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 305, 310 (Ramesh Thakur & William Maley, eds., 2015). 
 121. Id. at 309-10. 
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interventions in the developing world in the name of 
humanitarianism.122 However, these concerns seem to have been 
assuaged over the years. RtoP has gained cautious support in recent 
years from China, India, Nigeria, Argentina, and other states that had 
previously opposed RtoP as a repackaging of imperialist humanitarian 
interventionism.123 
Even strong proponents of RtoP acknowledge that it has been 
exercised selectively or with imperfect results. There were glaring 
failures to apply the doctrine in a number of crises involving mass 
atrocities from 2005 to 2011, such as the massacres in Darfur, South 
Sudan, and Sri Lanka.124 However, observers argue that since 2011, a 
number of mass atrocities and genocides have indeed generated 
coordinated responses from the international community even if RtoP 
was not explicitly invoked—the Rohingya chronic crisis being an 
exception.125 Proponents of the doctrine point out that the coordinated 
international response to these crises upheld the principles of the 
doctrine without necessarily doing so under formal invocation.126 
International responses in recent years show that a “collective 
international response” in the face of genocide and mass atrocities has 
become ‘“the norm.’”127 
In the Libyan crisis in 2011-12, the UNSC embraced a full RtoP 
engagement, authorizing a NATO-led military intervention and post-
conflict efforts.128 The subsequent instability and violence in Libya, 
which resulted in a lingering United Nations presence, generated 
considerable controversy about the invocation of RtoP as a precursor to 
regime change and nation building.129 The NATO-led mission was 
sharply criticized by a number of countries for mission creep and the 
use of disproportionate force.130 However, the Libyan delegation 
expressed unequivocal support for the decision during the 2012 General 
 
 122. See Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 31, 39 (2005). 
 123. Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten, 29 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 161, 161–
62 (2015) [hereinafter Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten]. 
 124. Id. at 165. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 166. 
 128. See S. C. Res. 2009 (Sept. 16, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
 129. See David Rieff, R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.
nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html. 
 130. Geir Ulfstein & Hege Christiansen, The Legality of the NATO Bombings in Libya, 62 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 159, 169–71 (2013). 
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Assembly informal debate on RtoP.131 Selective exercise of the RtoP 
doctrine remains a problem, as there has not been significant 
international intervention in crises that should have triggered RtoP after 
the Libyan intervention. Notably, the Rohingya chronic situation is 
among these unresolved situations. 
The legal status of RtoP is still evolving. The eighth informal 
debate on the doctrine, which followed the Secretary General’s ninth 
report on RtoP, showed that there was broad consensus on the principles 
of RtoP even as a number of states called for more to be done “to bridge 
the gap between [the] near universal commitment towards the 
prevention of atrocity crimes and the current state of implementation of 
these commitments.”132 RtoP appears to have achieved general 
acceptance as an international norm.133  However, in the absence of 
consistent implementation, the doctrine cannot be claimed to have 
attained the status of customary international law, which derives from 
the general law of nations rather than formal treaties or agreements and 
requires international practice and belief in the binding nature of the 
custom.134 
Despite the language of collective responsibility, RtoP does not 
impose any new legal obligations on states to intervene in a mass 
atrocity crisis.135 Instead, the doctrine consolidates and systematizes 
established practices of international human rights related law so the 
international community can intervene in crises of mass atrocities.136 
Regardless of whether the doctrine itself is explicitly invoked, RtoP 
legitimizes collective action for the protection of civilians when 
conscience-shocking mass atrocities occur. As Alex Bellamy argues, 
“[t]he fact that relevant international actors do not always directly 
invoke R[to]P is not evidence of its absence, any more than its 
 
 131. GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, “TIMELY AND DECISIVE 
RESPONSE” SUMMARY OF THE INFORMAL INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE OF THE U.N. GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT HELD ON 5 SEPTEMBER 2012 [hereinafter 
GCRP, SEPT. 5, 2012 SUMMARY], http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p_unga_dialogue_
2012.pdf. 
 132. Id.   
 133. Melissa Labonte, R2P’s Status As a Norm, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1, 2–3 (Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds., 2016). 
 134. Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 309–11 (2014). 
 135. Anne Orford, From Promise to Practice – The Legal Significance of the Responsibility 
to Protect Concept, 3 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 400, 402 (2011). 
 136. Id. at 419–21. 
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invocation means that it was the only cause to generate a particular 
outcome.”137 
Although RtoP has gained widespread acceptance as a set of 
shared expectations, the doctrine’s implementation in practice remains a 
fertile ground for critique. While the use of coercive measures, 
especially forceful interventions, remains highly controversial, states 
have expressed a strong consensus regarding the prevention of mass 
atrocity crimes.138 The Secretary General has called for moral and 
political accountability for the implementation of RtoP and “synergy 
across the UN” to prevent mass atrocities.139 After a study of country-
specific RtoP invocations, Jared Genser identified three conditions the 
existence of which correlate with successful UNSC implementation of 
RtoP: (1) the government of the perpetrator state must be willing or 
persuaded to accept UNSC assistance, (2) regional organizations must 
cooperate with the UNSC, and (3) the UNSC must have the capacity to 
respond to the situation.140 An additional precondition is that the 
permanent members must withhold their veto power.141 The 
strengthening of international human rights institutions can do much to 
ensure that the three conditions exist when a mass atrocity crisis 
requires RtoP intervention. Additionally, internal agreements can 
persuade permanent members to voluntarily restrain the exercise of their 
veto powers to block collective action.142 While the RtoP doctrine is not 
a legally binding instrument, it can harness existing norms to prevent 
and intervene in a mass atrocity crisis. 
III. ROHINGYA CHRONIC CRISIS 
The present Rohingya crisis is part of a chronic cycle of refugee 
crises precipitated by Burma/Myanmar’s long-standing discriminatory 
policies against the Rohingya people. Approximately 800,000 Rohingya 
live in the troubled Rakhine State of Burma/Myanmar, with another 
500,000 living in other parts of the country.143 As of December 2017, 
 
 137. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, R2P in Theory and Practice, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 133, at 3, 10. 
 138. GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, SUMMARY OF THE INFORMAL 
INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, 6 SEPTEMBER 2017, at 3 [hereinafter GCRP, SEPT. 6, 2017 SUMMARY], http://www.
globalr2p.org/media/files/2017-summary-of-unga-r2p-interactive-dialogue.pdf.   
 139. Id. 
 140. Genser, supra note 118, at 425. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 432-33. 
 143. FARZANA, supra note 14, at 2. 
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over 620,000 of Myanmar’s Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh, most 
of them from the Rakhine State.144 The number of Rohingya refugees 
since August 2017 alone has outpaced the total number of migrants 
attempting to enter Europe via the Mediterranean in 2016.145 The 
Rohingya crisis needs a permanent solution instead of reactive, crisis-
driven fixes. It calls for the framework of RtoP to assist 
Burma/Myanmar in keeping the peace and in building peace through 
mediation, diplomacy, and other international political pressures. 
As UNSC António Guterres noted, Rohingyas have long suffered 
from “[prolonged] statelessness and its associated discrimination.”146 
The roots of the crisis lie in the complex relationship between the 
Rohingyas, an ethnic Muslim group based in the Rakhine region, and 
the dominant Buddhist state. Burma/Myanmar is an ethnically diverse 
country, with over 100 distinct ethnic groups.147 Ethnic Burmans, mostly 
Buddhists, represent about two-thirds of the population.148 Rohingyas 
possess a distinct language and culture, and claim descent from Arab 
and Persian traders who settled in the region in the Eighth Century.149 
The Burma/Myanmar government does not accept that the 
Rohingya are a distinct ethnic group.150 According to the 
Burma/Myanmar government, the Rohingya are Bengalis who entered 
Burma/Myanmar as laborers in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-
centuries when the region was a province of India under British rule, or 
more recently as illegal immigrants following Bangladesh’s war of 
independence from Pakistan in 1971.151 The state’s classification of the 
Rohingyas as Bengalis has a political impact on the constitutional status 
of the individuals who identify as ethnic Rohingyas. 
After Burma/Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 
1948, the state was plagued by armed conflicts among various ethnic 
groups.152 In 1962, a military coup led by General Ne Win overthrew the 
fledgling parliamentary democracy in what was represented as an 
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attempt to restore order to the internal political chaos.153 A new socialist 
Constitution was instituted in 1974, and the country entered a period of 
isolationism.154 The 1974 Constitution enabled the military government 
to implement a range of initiatives aimed at creating national unity, 
suppressing counter insurgencies, and establishing Buddhism as the 
official state religion.155 
The military government viewed ethnic diversity as unacceptable 
to Burma/Myanmar’s modern political identity. As part of its 
postcolonial nation-building program, the military government followed 
a program of forced assimilation of the different ethnic groups into a 
homogeneous Burmese identity, with no recognition of any symbols of 
minority identities.156 The military government’s policies of 
“Burmanisation” led to the development of an ethno-racial Buddhist 
nationalism that viewed all of Burma/Myanmar’s Muslim ethnicities as 
second-class citizens and debased foreigners.157 
Burma/Myanmar’s discriminatory policies towards the Rohingya 
since the 1970s have created what many regard as “a chronic refugee 
crisis.”158 Burma/Myanmar withdrew recognition of Rohingyas as 
citizens, effectively denying them civil service or military jobs.159 The 
Emergency Immigration Act of 1974, ostensibly enacted to curb illegal 
immigration from neighboring India, Bangladesh, and China, required 
all Burmese/Myanmar citizens to carry national registration 
certificates.160 However, the Act designated Rohingyas as holders of 
foreign registration cards.161 Many Rohingyas refused the foreign 
registration cards in order to assert their right to be counted as citizens 
of Burma/Myanmar, but this action meant they were left without state 
identification.162 
In 1977, during another ostensible crackdown on illegal 
immigration, the military instituted the Naga Min (Dragon King) 
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program to verify and register individuals’ identity cards and citizenship 
documents.163 In the Rakhine State, the program degenerated into 
violent attacks against Rohingyas led by the army and local Buddhist 
residents.164 The Naga Min operation resulted in massive numbers of 
internally displaced people, with approximately 200,000 Rohingyas 
fleeing to Bangladesh as refugees.165 Initially, Burma/Myanmar denied 
responsibility for these displacements and claimed that the government 
had no obligations towards anyone who crossed the border into 
Bangladesh.166 However, two years later, the government signed a 
bilateral agreement for the forced repatriation of the Rohingya 
refugees.167 In the interim, Bangladesh engaged in a campaign of 
violence, accompanied by a reduction of food aid provided to the 
refugees, to create conditions intended to force the refugees to turn 
back.168 Around 12,000 Rohingyas starved to death in the Bangladesh 
refugee camps.169 
In 1991-92, yet another crisis followed a similar trajectory. After 
eruptions of post-election violence, more than 250,000 Rohingyas fled 
to Bangladesh to escape abuses and repressive state policies.170 Like the 
earlier 1977-78 crisis, a bilateral agreement led to many refugees being 
forcibly repatriated.171 Eventually, the UNHCR established a limited 
field presence promoting voluntary returns in 1994.172 However, as 
Human Rights Watch notes, the situation was far from resolved, 
because new arrivals continued even as the UNHCR lauded its 
repatriation efforts.173 Although the arrival of new refugees suggested 
that country conditions did not offer adequate guarantees of safety, the 
UNHCR labeled the new arrivals as economic migrants and continued 
to push for voluntary repatriation.174 Additionally, the repatriation of 
Rohingya refugees to Burma/Myanmar in both 1978 and 1996 was 
tainted by reports of excessive force used by the security forces of both 
Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar, and the Rohingyas who returned 
were granted only limited rights to employment, residence, marriage, 
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and freedom of movement within the country.175 Severe governmental 
restrictions on movement, employment, education, and healthcare 
constrained the Rohingyas to live under dehumanizing conditions that 
suggested a system of apartheid.176 
The outbreak of sectarian violence in 2012-13 between ethnic 
Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingyas precipitated yet another crisis.177 
The clashes resulted in the destruction of thousands of homes and many 
mosques and left about 200 dead.178 Burmese/Myanmar security forces 
refused to protect the Rohingyas and even joined in the violence against 
them.179 The violence forced “at least 125,000 Rohingya and other 
Muslims, and a small number of Arakanese” into inadequate camps for 
internally displaced persons.180 The government obstructed humanitarian 
access to the affected areas and did nothing to bring the perpetrators to 
justice.181 In 2012, 140,000 individuals were internally displaced while 
another 86,000 fled to neighboring countries.182 
The present crisis which started in August 2017 is a continuation 
of a recurrent pattern of Burma/Myanmar’s marginalization, abuse, and 
periodic violent expulsions of the Rohingyas. Not surprisingly, a 
Rohingya separatist group has emerged.183 On August 25, 2017, the 
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (“ARSA”), a militant Rohingya 
group, launched a coordinated attack on dozens of police stations and an 
army base, killing twelve security officers.184 The military’s 
counterinsurgency campaign deployed disproportionate violence in 
response.185 In the weeks that followed, entire villages were set on fire 
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and satellite data show entire villages burned to the ground.186 The 
Burmese/Myanmar military and Buddhist vigilantes engaged in mass 
killings, arson, rape, torture, and other atrocities perpetrated on the 
civilian Rohingya population in retaliation for the attacks on the 
security outposts.187 Numerous credible reports have emerged 
demonstrating that Burma’s/Myanmar’s military waged a systematic 
campaign of gang rapes of Rohingya women and girls.188 The 
Burmese/Myanmar government’s actions have attempted to impose 
collective punishment on innocent civilians in what United Nations and 
relief agency observers described as ethnic cleansing or genocide.189 
The discrimination and violence the Rohingyas suffered is tied to 
their constitutional status within Burma/Myanmar as stateless 
persons.190 Following the massive forced repatriation of Rohingyas from 
Bangladesh after the 1978 Naga Min operation, the Burma/Myanmar 
government enacted the Burma Citizenship Act in 1982. While the 
preceding Union Citizenship Act of 1948 conferred equal rights on all 
citizens, the 1982 law established an exclusionary and stratified regime 
of rights based on ethnicity and descent.191 Anyone deemed a foreigner 
has virtually no pathway to citizenship under this regime. The Burma 
Citizenship Act repealed the Union Citizenship Act of 1948, which 
conferred de facto citizenship on Rohingyas.192 Nearly a million 
Rohingyas were effectively rendered stateless by the 1982 law, which 
classified them as resident foreigners or illegal immigrants.193 
The Burma Citizenship Act divided individuals into four 
categories, with each group assigned a color-coded Citizenship Scrutiny 
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Card: “citizens,” “associate citizens,” “naturalized citizens,” and 
“resident foreigners.”194 Individuals who belonged to one of the 
recognized “national races” or whose ancestors had settled in 
Burma/Myanmar prior to 1823 were categorized as “citizens.”195 
Citizenship by birth is available only to a person whose birth parents are 
full citizens.196 However, Rohingyas were not included in the list of 135 
indigenous groups that qualified for full citizenship.197 A child born to 
one or more Rohingya parents was therefore not eligible for citizenship 
by birth. 
The second category of “associate citizens” recognizes individuals 
who did not belong to one of the recognized indigenous groups and who 
have one grandfather or pre-1823 ancestor who was a foreigner. 198 The 
category also covers individuals who had applied for citizenship under 
the Union Citizenship Act of 1948, prior to the enactment of the Burma 
Citizenship Act.199 Again, most Rohingya were unable to satisfy the 
requirements for “associate citizenship” status since few had officially 
applied for citizenship under the 1948 law.200 Additionally, the window 
of opportunity to apply for “associate citizen” status lasted for only one 
year after the passage of the 1982 law, and many eligible Rohingyas 
missed the deadline.201 Furthermore, Rohingya leaders contended that 
they should be granted full citizenship status since they were previously 
recognized as one of the indigenous groups.202 “Associate citizenship” is 
contingent on the discretion of a “Central Body,” operating under the 
President’s office, which has unlimited power to revoke an individual’s 
“associate citizen” status for “disaffection or disloyalty to the state” or 
“moral turpitude.”203 
The third category of “naturalized citizens” covers non-nationals 
who are not members of one of the 135 recognized indigenous groups, 
and who could provide “conclusive evidence” that they or their parents 
had settled in Burma/Myanmar prior to 1948, provided these individuals 
also satisfied eligibility criteria, such as fluency in a national language, 
being over 18 years old, possessing a good moral character, and being 
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of sound mind.204 This third category also covers individuals who have a 
parent that holds one of the three types of Burmese/Myanmar 
citizenship.205 Although Rohingyas could qualify for “naturalized 
citizen” status, many Rohingya leaders protested that Rohingyas should 
not have to apply for this status, since they already enjoyed citizenship 
status under the 1948 Union Citizenship law.206 The fourth category of 
“resident foreigners” have no citizenship rights and are not allowed to 
enroll in higher education, move freely within the country, or hold 
public office.207 Most Rohingyas belong to this last category, because 
they could not provide the necessary documentation to satisfy the 
“conclusive evidence” requirement for either “associate citizen” or 
“naturalized citizen” status.208 Due to the repeated displacements, 
violence, and structural inequities, many Rohingyas had lost all of their 
possessions, including official documentation.209 Additionally, as rural 
people, most Rohingyas lacked documentation because of their poverty, 
lack of property ownership, and their custom of home births. 210 
The Burma Citizenship Law effectively stripped the Rohingya of 
citizenship and transformed them into a stateless people, not recognized 
as citizens in the country where they lived. By delisting the Rohingya in 
the list of recognized indigenous group within the descent-based 
citizenship framework (jus sanguinis) of the Burma Citizenship Act, the 
government ensured that individuals of Rohingya descent had no path to 
citizenship regardless of how long they had resided in the country.211 
The Rohingyas were thereby deprived of essential civil, social, and 
political rights granted to citizens. Burma/Myanmar is not alone among 
states in “increasingly bestowing, denying, or retracting citizenship as a 
political weapon” so as to ration the distribution of rights and 
privileges.212 Statelessness has been directly linked to a range of human 
rights abuses, including vulnerability to displacement, human 
trafficking, and child labor, among others.213 These problems of human 
rights abuses intensify when a state deploys the denial of citizenship as 
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an instrument of racial and ethnic discrimination to delegitimize 
minorities,214 as Burma/Myanmar has done with the Rohingyas. 
The Rohingya chronic crisis has regional and geopolitical 
repercussions. In addition to the drastic impact on Bangladesh, the main 
host country bearing the brunt of the Rohingya refugee influx, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are also variously impacted.215 
Furthermore, the broader Muslim world may become entangled in the 
crisis if refugees become radicalized. Burma/Myanmar has been broadly 
censured by the international community.216 Resolving the chronic crisis 
requires international oversight from world actors who can bring moral 
leadership to the complexities of the situation. With the RtoP 
framework, the immediate emergency and long-term underlying 
problems can be addressed to develop a lasting solution for the recurrent 
cycles of violence and chronic refugee crisis. 
IV. RTOP APPLICATION 
The Rohingya chronic crisis calls for the robust and coordinated 
international response that an invocation of RtoP can generate. 
Conditions show the existence of the three criteria that, according to 
Genser, have characterized successful RtoP actions: the UNSC has the 
capacity to respond to the crisis, Myanmar’s government is showing 
willingness to cooperate with the UNSC, and regional countries are 
willing to engage with the UNSC’s efforts.217 RtoP will enable the 
international community to implement a long-term strategy that not only 
addresses the current human rights catastrophe but also remedies the 
underlying causes that lead to periodic human rights catastrophes. 
Although stopping short of an explicit invocation of RtoP, the 
UNSC has engaged actively with the situation. In prior Rohingya crises, 
the evidence of mass atrocities was speculative, making any RtoP action 
a risky proposition. However, the evidence of ethnic cleansing in the 
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current crisis is overwhelming,218 and the situation may also meet the 
elements of genocide.219 Ethnic cleansing and genocide are both triggers 
for an RtoP invocation. In November 2017, the UNSC issued a 
presidential statement strongly condemning Burma/Myanmar for the 
violence and the limited humanitarian access to affected regions.220 In 
April 2018, an UNSC delegation visiting the main refugee camps in 
Cox’s Bazaar expressed strong dismay at the stories of suffering they 
heard from refugees.221 Also, in April 2018, the UNSC delegation 
visited the Rakhine state, calling for Burma/Myanmar to conform to 
international standards for the safe and dignified repatriation of the 
Rohingya refugees.222 The delegation also asked Burma/Myanmar to 
work with the United Nations and international community and to hold 
perpetrators of atrocities accountable.223 
Although Burma/Myanmar continues its blanket denials of any 
wrongdoing, the government’s position on working with the UNSC 
shows indications of progress.224 The UNSC delegation met with 
Burma/Myanmar’s leader, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and the 
military commander-in-chief, General Min Aung Hlaing.225 In April 
2018, Bangladesh and the UNHCR signed a memorandum of 
understanding regarding the safe and voluntary repatriation of the 
Rohingyas to Burma/Myanmar.226 The memorandum asked that the 
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Burma/Myanmar government provide access to United Nations 
humanitarian relief agencies to the Rakhine state.227 Aung San Suu Kyi 
has agreed to allow United Nations development and human rights 
organizations to enter Burma/Myanmar to build the appropriate 
conditions in Rakhine for the return of the refugees.228 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), a 
regional organization of ten member states, has maintained silence on 
the Rohingya crisis. 229 ASEAN is deeply committed to non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of members.230 However, several ASEAN 
members have been outspoken in their criticism of Burma/Myanmar’s 
actions. For example, during the March 2018 Australia-ASEAN 
summit, the Prime Minister of Malaysia publicly reproached 
Burma/Myanmar for its treatment of the Rohingyas and called for a 
“just and durable solution.”231 Indonesia and Singapore have also 
expressed criticism.232 Despite ASEAN’s public silence, a number of the 
regional powers and ASEAN members have shown a willingness to 
cooperate with a U.N.-led effort to address the situation.233 Additionally, 
ASEAN and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (“OCHA”) have signed an interoperability brief 
delineating areas of collaboration regarding instances of humanitarian 
relief, which would provide a blueprint for a cooperative effort.234 
Additionally, Aung San Suu Kyi has explicitly requested assistance 
from ASEAN in a closed-door meeting of the organization, thereby 
easing the path for cooperation with United Nations and relief 
agencies.235 
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The conditions are now opportune for UNSC to call for RtoP 
diplomatic and peacekeeping intervention in the Rohingya crisis. The 
doctrine offers promising opportunities for building a durable solution 
that addresses both the current situation and the long-term inequities 
that fuel periodic violence. The international community should pursue 
four objectives. 
Humanitarian refugee crisis in Bangladesh. The refugee crisis in 
Bangladesh poses immense humanitarian and logistical challenges. 
Bangladesh is hosting over one million Rohingyas displaced from 
Burma/Myanmar.236 Most of the refugees are living in makeshift 
shelters in the highly congested Cox’s Bazaar area, without sufficient 
food, cooking fuel, and cooking utensils.237 Adequate sanitation 
facilities and healthcare are also urgently needed to combat outbreaks of 
communicable diseases.238 The start of the rainy season has brought 
additional dangers of flooding and landslides.239 Although a small 
country about the size of Iowa, with a 163 million population of its own, 
Bangladesh has shown great compassion in accepting the Rohingya 
exodus from Burma/Myanmar.240 Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stated 
that while Bangladesh accepts the humanitarian responsibility to shelter 
the refugees, the influx has placed “massive socioeconomic, 
environmental, and demographic pressure” on her country.241 
Bangladesh and the UNHCR must coordinate relief efforts, which must 
include relocation to higher ground during the monsoon season, to 
manage the refugee encampments. 
In addition to managing the day-to-day operations of the refugee 
camps, the international community must assist Bangladesh in devising 
long-term plans for the refugees, because repatriation seems unlikely to 
occur soon. Bangladesh has provided sanctuary to displaced Rohingyas 
for nearly twenty years.242 However, Bangladesh is not a party to the 
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1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or to the 1967 
Protocol, and thus is not bound by the Convention’s prohibition against 
non-refoulement.243 Only approximately 33,000 of the one million 
displaced Rohingyas currently in Bangladesh have been registered as 
refugees.244 Without official recognition as refugees, the vast majority of 
displaced Rohingyas do not have the right to seek asylum conferred 
under international refugee law. The international community must 
meet the funding needs required to enable the U.N. and other 
humanitarian aid agencies to scale up relief efforts. In addition, the 
international community should entertain economic development and 
education plans that enable the refugees to lead a dignified life while 
awaiting repatriation. 
Repatriation and long-term solutions. The international 
community must have oversight of any repatriation process to ensure 
that returns are voluntary and safe. The most immediate task is to 
guarantee that the violence has stopped. In November 2017, Bangladesh 
and Burma/Myanmar signed a repatriation agreement to start 
repatriation in January 2018.245 The agreement drew considerable 
criticism from human rights groups because it contained no guarantees 
of safe conditions. 246 It was also unclear whether the Rohingyas would 
be allowed to return to their former homes or if Burma/Myanmar 
intended to detain them indefinitely in camps.247 Since 2012, 
approximately 120,000 Rohingya continue to be detained in 
Burma/Myanmar in squalid conditions in camps for internally displaced 
people.248 
In March 2018, Myanmar agreed to the UNHCR initiative on 
repatriation, but progress on the details has been slow.249  In April 2018, 
Bangladesh and the UNHCR signed an agreement laying out the 
framework for safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation.250 However, 
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the U.N. does not believe that current conditions in Burma/Myanmar 
are conducive to the return of the Rohingyas, and the Rohingyas have 
stated that they will not agree to return unless Burma/Myanmar 
recognizes their legal rights to security, citizenship, and basic rights.251 
International pressure on and oversight of the repatriation process 
is crucial for ensuring that Rohingya refugees are secure from further 
violence upon return and that they are not further victimized by 
prolonged incarceration in camps for internally displaced persons. The 
international community must insist that Burma/Myanmar provide 
access to UNHCR monitors who can assess the conditions. 
Additionally, the existing camps for internally displaced persons should 
be dismantled, and the individuals living in them should be resettled 
permanently. Returning Rohingyas should be placed in or near where 
they lived before, not in temporary camps. 
Accountability for human rights abuses, including conflict-related 
sexual violence. Accountability is essential for reconciliation. A lasting 
peace will require communities to confront the truth of the traumatic 
events and create a process of reconciliation. A process of reconciliation 
will require accountability for all forms of violence against civilians. 
Accountability is especially important for victims of mass rapes and 
sexual violence used as instruments of ethnic cleansing. Rohingya 
women and girls have been subjected to horrific acts of sexual violence 
by vigilantes acting in concert with Burmese/Myanmar military to force 
the populations to leave permanently.252 The Secretary General has 
called on the Burma/Myanmar government to prosecute suspected 
perpetrators of sexual violence and to permit “unfettered access” to 
human rights monitors and aid providers.253 
The UNSC must refer the atrocities to the ICC, which has 
recognized rape as a war crime since 2016. Although Burma/Myanmar 
is not a signatory to the ICC, a prosecution will signal that the 
international community will not tolerate rape as a weapon of ethnic 
cleansing. The ICC prosecutor has already asked the court whether it 
can take jurisdiction because of the presence of refugees in the territory 
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of Bangladesh, a signatory to the ICC.254 Human rights monitors must 
be allowed access to Burma/Myanmar and so must special factfinders 
appointed for gathering evidence for sexual violence. 
The international community must assist the government of 
Bangladesh in providing victims of sexual violence in the refugee 
camps with psychological and medical care, including comprehensive 
medical care related to pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, 
fistulas, and other rape-related physical conditions. Rape survivors and 
other women and girls should be encouraged to meet in designated safe 
spaces to talk, build community, and share support. Women and girls 
should be provided opportunities for literacy and job skills trainings. 
Measures should be taken to ensure the safety of women and girls in the 
camps. 
Structural Violence. The Rohingya chronic crisis requires a long-
term plan for eliminating structural discrimination. The Kofi Annan 
Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was formed in September 
2016. The Advisory Commission is an independent commission chaired 
by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and comprised of a 
coterie of international leaders. The Annan Commission submitted its 
Final Report in August 2017,255 around the time that violence erupted 
yet again. The international community must pressure Burma/Myanmar 
to adopt the recommendations in the Report for comprehensive reform 
of citizenship, rights, and anti-discrimination laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Global public opinion against a state’s failure to protect its citizens 
can be effective in getting the state to do the right thing. The RtoP 
doctrine’s combination of public shaming with muscular international 
diplomacy can move states towards the international norms of human 
rights. As Jennifer Welsh observes, the real value of the RtoP doctrine 
may lie in the institution of “a duty of conduct,” requiring the 
international community to stand witness to atrocities and to deliberate 
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on potential responses by different actors.256 As a nation emerging into 
the global economy after a half century of isolation, Burma/Myanmar’s 
government is sensitive to potential trade partners urging it to safeguard 
the rights of the Rohingyas by resolving the statelessness and 
citizenship issues. The World Bank and other investment partners view 
the country as one of the fastest growing economies in East Asia and are 
eager to engage with the country.257 However, mounting global 
disapprobation of Burma/Myanmar’s conduct towards the Rohingyas 
can damage the country’s profile.258 The price for Burma/Myanmar to 
enter into the international community should be that it respect the 
international norm of protecting the country’s populations from 
atrocities. Diplomatic efforts harnessed by the RtoP framework can 
incentivize Burma/Myanmar to build a stable and secure state that will 
attract global investment and tourism. 
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